Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) have recently emerged as a troubling phenomenon in India. A SLAPP is a lawsuit “intended to censor, intimidate and silence critics”. In practice, powerful entities (often corporations or politicians) use libel, defamation or related suits to punish journalists, activists or small organizations for exposing issues of public concern. These cases target public-interest speech and burden defenders with high legal costs, leveraging the threat of massive damages to force retractions or silence. The Supreme Court has even recognized SLAPPs as suits filed by people with “immense economic power” to prevent the public from “participating in important affairs in the public interest”. As Indian courts grapple with this challenge, they have begun to develop strategies to protect freedom of expression and encourage robust public debate.
Defining SLAPP Suits and Their Characteristics
SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) suits are distinguished from ordinary litigation by their intent and context. They usually target acts of public participation – for example, investigative journalism, environmental advocacy, protests or whistleblowing. Common indicators of SLAPP suits in India include:
- Public-interest focus: The subject of the lawsuit involves matters of wide public concern, such as corruption, environmental harm or rights abuses.
- Personalized targets: Suits are often filed against individuals (independent journalists, activists or critics) rather than the organizations they represent.
- Lack of genuine cause: The legal claims are frequently frivolous or unsound, lacking a valid cause of action. The goal is not to win on the merits, but to punish criticism and drive up legal expenses.
- Disproportionate demands: Plaintiffs typically seek excessive remedies – huge damages awards or broad gag orders – far beyond any realistic harm.
These features serve an intimidation purpose. The lawsuits are designed to burden critics, not to adjudicate legitimate disputes. As one commentator explains, the “aim is not to win the case on legal merits but to bury the defendant in excessive legal costs”. In India, the imbalance of resources is clear: independent journalists and small NGOs are far more vulnerable to SLAPP suits than well-funded corporations.
Many nations (the USA, Canada, UK and others) have enacted anti-SLAPP laws granting early dismissal of frivolous suits and fee-shifting to protect public participation. India has no such statute, so courts must rely on existing civil procedure rules and constitutional guarantees. The lack of a clear anti-SLAPP provision is widely noted: “There is no direct statutory provision under Indian law that can be said to be anti-SLAPP”. As a result, litigation strategies and court safeguards have become crucial to shield free speech.
Impact on Journalists, Activists and Civil Society
SLAPP suits exert a severe chilling effect on free expression. Indian courts have warned that pre-trial injunctions in defamation and similar cases often act as a “death sentence” for the disputed content. In practical terms, once an injunction is granted, the speaker may have to take down articles or be silenced indefinitely, even before any trial.
The targets of SLAPP suits typically bear a heavy personal and financial burden. Journalists, activists and whistle-blowers are forced to divert time and resources into legal battles instead of their work. As the International Commission of Jurists notes, SLAPP suits filed in India are usually civil defamation or injunction actions (sometimes criminal defamation), and they leave “journalists, activists and targeted women … burdened with having to defend themselves in court and the costs related to this defense.”. Wealthy plaintiffs exploit this disparity: studies show that socioeconomic power is often decisive, as SLAPP defendants (media outlets or NGOs) face prohibitive legal fees. In one example, a company demanded ₹50,000 from a school-teacher journalist in an 1862 case simply to intimidate him, knowing she could not pay and would likely retract her criticism.
SLAPPs also undermine the right to know. Courts have recognized that such litigation can prevent important information from reaching the public. The Supreme Court underscored that gag orders chill “the public’s right to know” and should only be granted with utmost caution. Similarly, a recent Madras High Court decision decried defamation proceedings as a “tool of intimidation” wielded by deep-pocketed politicians and corporations against the media. In that case, the court quashed criminal defamation charges against a national newspaper and journalists, affirming that innocent mistakes in reporting cannot justify silencing a free press.
In short, SLAPP suits in India target vulnerable public-interest voices and siphon away their resources and time. By chilling reporting and criticism, they undermine democratic participation and discourage citizens from speaking out.
Judicial Response and Key Case Law
Faced with the rise of SLAPP litigation, Indian courts have begun pushing back through judicial caution and creative use of procedure. The trend is marked by a common theme: courts will not lightly suppress speech without strong reasons. They emphasize the high value of the fundamental right to freedom of expression, especially in matters of public interest.
- Supreme Court – Bloomberg v. Zee (2024): In a landmark order (March 22, 2024), a three-judge bench (CJI Chandrachud, J. Pardiwala, J. Misra) set aside an injunction that had barred Bloomberg TV from publishing an article about Zee Entertainment. The Court explicitly warned of SLAPP dangers and mandated a stricter test for pre-trial injunctions in media cases. It held that an interim gag on speech is permissible only in “exceptional cases” where the content is clearly “malicious or palpably false”, or where the defendant’s case would “undoubtedly fail at trial”. In all other cases, any censorship order must await a full trial. The Court borrowed the English Bonnard v. Perryman standard, underscoring that interference with speech requires “exceptional caution”. Crucially, the bench noted that SLAPP suits by entities of “immense economic power” aim to “prevent the public from knowing about or participating in important affairs in the public interest”. This recognition signals the highest court’s awareness of SLAPPs and its commitment to uphold open debate.
- Delhi High Court – Tata Sons v. Greenpeace (2011): In a notable defamation suit by Tata Sons against Greenpeace, the Delhi HC (Justice S. Ravindra Bhat) applied the Bonnard principle long before it was formalized in the Bloomberg case. Greenpeace had published a protest “game” against a Tata-backed port project, raising environmental concerns. The Court refused Tata’s application for interim relief, holding that an injunction could only issue if Greenpeace’s defence of truth had no chance of success. Since the court could not determine truth or falsity on the pleadings, granting a gag order would have unfairly “freeze[d] public debate” on an issue of wide interest. In sum, the court protected the protesters’ speech, recognizing that free discussion of public issues should not be muzzled by premature orders.
- Delhi High Court – Crop Care Federation v. Rajasthan Patrika (2009): This early case explicitly labeled a defamation suit as a SLAPP. A pesticide industry trade group sued a newspaper for articles on pesticide levels. The court noted that the plaintiff’s purpose was plainly to “stifle debate” about pesticide use, not to vindicate a genuine grievance. Because the articles made no direct reference to the plaintiff’s members, the court found no cause of action for defamation. Striking the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, Justice Ravindra Bhat observed that free speech is the “life blood of democracy”, and that injunctions or damages in such suits inflict incalculable harm on the public’s right to know. This decision declared that using litigation to silence public-interest criticism was an abuse of process.
- Madras High Court – Menaka v. Arappor Iyakkam (2019): In this case, a politician sought a wide ad-interim injunction preventing activists from speaking about alleged corruption. Justice R. Subramanian of Madras HC refused the gag order by following the Bonnard rule: since the activists had pled the defence of truth, an injunction was only possible if it was “prima facie clear” they could not prove their defence. The court denied the applicants’ prayer, effectively allowing debate to continue pending trial. This judgment (and others like it) underscores the willingness of Indian courts to carefully scrutinize SLAPP-type injunctions.
- Other High Court Decisions: A handful of other High Court cases have directly addressed SLAPP arguments. For example, in Vidyaa v. Metallic Bellows (Madras, 2019), the court dismissed a defamation suit at the pleading stage for no cause of action, calling it a textbook SLAPP “intended to muzzle the airing of critical views”. In another recent instance, the Delhi HC in Prashant Singh v. The Chairman, State Bank of India (2023) used Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to quash a baseless defamation claim, citing Crop Care. (The Menaka and Vidyaa cases, while not globally reported, reinforce the message that courts will not tolerate litigants misusing the judicial process to silence debate.)
In all these cases, Indian courts have embraced a cautious approach to injunctions. The common thread is the Bonnard principle: an ex parte censorship order is reserved for clear cases of defamation (where the published allegations are plainly false). Otherwise, courts insist on hearing the defendant and conducting a trial. This stance effectively curtails one of the main weapons of SLAPP plaintiffs – the quick “death penalty” injunction. In Bloomberg, the Supreme Court explicitly held that without a showing of malice or hopeless defence, speech cannot be frozen before trial.
Judicial Tools to Combat SLAPP Suits
In the absence of explicit anti-SLAPP laws, courts are leaning on existing civil procedure rules to filter out abusive cases early. For instance, Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC allows a defendant to move to reject a plaint that fails to disclose any cause of action. Courts have repeatedly used this provision to dismiss SLAPP-like suits at the outset. If the facts as pleaded make no viable claim (as in Crop Care and Vidyaa), the suit can be thrown out without delay.
Other procedural safeguards include:
- Order VI, Rule 16 CPC: empowers courts to strike out pleadings that are “unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious” or an “abuse of process”. Defendants can ask judges to remove baseless allegations or entire suits that fit this description.
- Order XXXIX, Rule 4 CPC: allows courts to vacate unfair interim injunctions and grant relief if they cause undue hardship. A defendant can argue that an SLAPP injunction is causing irreparable injury to free speech.
- Section 35A CPC (Compensatory Costs): This provision authorizes courts to award costs or damages against parties who pursue “false” or “vexatious” claims or defences. Courts have cited Section 35A in other contexts to penalize abusive litigation. Imposing heavy cost orders on SLAPP plaintiffs can deter future frivolous suits.
- Inherent Power (Section 151 CPC): Judges can invoke their inherent jurisdiction against any “abuse of the process of the Court”. In other words, if a defamation case is brought solely to harass a critic (causing “inconvenience, harassment and expense”), the court can strike it down in the name of preventing abuse of justice.
- New Criminal Law Reforms: Notably, India’s new criminal laws (the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) introduce Section 273, which empowers courts to award compensation to an accused person if defamation or other charges are found to be malicious or baseless. This is analogous to anti-SLAPP fee-shifting: it holds the complainant liable for the victim’s legal expenses if the case fails.
Together, these tools give Indian judges a repertoire to push back against SLAPP tactics. As one analysis notes, such powers “can significantly mitigate the impact of SLAPP suits by… filtering out frivolous claims against critics early in the legal process”. In practice, however, success depends on the courts’ willingness to identify the pattern. For years SLAPPs went largely unrecognized; it is only recently that defendants explicitly raised “SLAPP” in court and found some traction. The recent deluge of commentary and high court rulings suggests growing judicial cognizance of the issue.
Statutory Framework and Gaps
India currently lacks dedicated anti-SLAPP legislation. By comparison, many U.S. states and countries like Canada have passed laws enabling swift dismissal of SLAPP suits and fee awards for defendants. In India, courts have been left to stretch general laws instead. As one commentator puts it, “the concept of SLAPP suits in Indian jurisprudence has not been present, unlike the US system”.
The existing legal framework offers partial remedies but also reveals gaps:
- Civil Defamation Law: Indian law still recognizes civil defamation, where an aggrieved person can seek damages. SLAPP plaintiffs typically file under Sections 499–500 IPC (criminal defamation) or Order 7, Rule 11 CPC (civil defamation). The threat of huge damage claims (often speculative) is a principal SLAPP tactic. There have been calls to review the balance between protecting reputation and free speech. The Supreme Court’s Bonnard-guided approach effectively limits civil defamation injunctions, but the underlying right to sue remains.
- Criminal Defamation: Until recently, defamation under Sections 499–500 IPC remained a criminal offence, though prosecutions for criticism of public officials raised free-speech concerns. India’s new penal code (BNSS, 2023) retains defamation but requires complainants to show malice or prove falsity. It also introduces Section 273 (compensation for malicious prosecutions), which could deter frivolous cases. Still, criminal defamation laws themselves have been criticized as chilling speech. (Some reformers advocate repealing them entirely.)
- Civil Procedure and Costs: The CPC amendments of 2002 introduced Section 35A (costs for false/vexatious cases), which is applicable to SLAPP-like misconduct. However, courts have traditionally been conservative in awarding costs, and Section 35A is not frequently invoked in defamation suits. Recognizing the “deadly” impact of interim injunctions, the Supreme Court in 2024 effectively created a judicially-imposed “mini-anti-SLAPP” rule for defamation cases, but this is not codified.
- Other Laws Misused: SLAPP plaintiffs sometimes misuse other statutes – e.g. invoking provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act or UAPA to pressure critics. No statutory safeguards exist against such strategic uses. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) rules could, in theory, allow courts to dismiss sham PILs, but there is no specific anti-abuse mechanism for defamation or SLAPP suits.
In summary, Indian law provides tools in the armoury (CPC rules, new penalty sections, Bar Council norms against unethical practice), but no clear counter-SLAPP regime. The legislative gap means that mitigating SLAPPs relies heavily on judicial activism and interpretation of general principles.
Conclusion and the Need for Reform
The rise of SLAPP suits in India poses a real threat to freedom of expression and the public’s right to information. By abusing defamation and injunction proceedings, powerful actors can sideline scrutiny and discourage others from speaking up. The judiciary has begun to take notice. Recent judgments – from high courts to the Supreme Court – stress that speech on public issues deserves protection. Courts are increasingly applying the Bonnard standard and exercising caution: they will not stifle debate unless it is abundantly clear that the defendant has no defense. Orders like the one in Bloomberg v Zee (2024) signal a welcome “activist” judicial stance, underscoring that injunctions cannot be wielded as an extra-legal weapon.
Nonetheless, judicial measures alone may not be sufficient. Experts and civil society have urged legislative action. Possible reforms include enacting a formal anti-SLAPP law or amending existing statutes. Such a law might allow early case review and dismissal of meritless suits filed against public interest speech, much like laws in the U.S., Canada or the UK. Other ideas include mandatory security for costs in defamation suits, or explicit cost-shifting provisions when public participation is involved. Internationally, courts have also relied on constitutionally-trumped-injunction standards; India’s judges could consider similar high-level guidelines to ensure free debate is not unduly curtailed.
For now, the takeaway is twofold. First, SLAPP suits in India are being recognized as a systemic problem: corporate and political defamation cases aimed at “intimidate[ing]” critics must be met with principled resistance. Second, remedies do exist under Indian law, and courts are learning to deploy them. If these trends continue — combined with possible legislative reforms — India’s democracy may yet find a stronger balance between reputation and the vital right of citizens to speak and participate.
References
- Khanna, Yamika, “Shaping Judicial Safeguards Against SLAPP Suits: Emerging Protections in Indian Law” (Oxford Human Rights Hub, Oct. 7, 2024).
- SLAPP suits being used by powerful entities to prevent free speech, SC cautions courts (Indian Express, Mar. 28, 2024).
- Goyal, Ritika, “Understanding SLAPP Suits Through the Lens of Netflix Movie ‘Maharaj’” (LiveLaw, Aug. 19, 2024).
- Singh, Payal, “Global Blocking Order Against Book on Baba Ramdev: X warns of dangerous precedent” (LawChakra, Dec. 2024).
- Gulati, Soumya et al., “Breaking down SLAPP: Responding to and Overcoming Legal Challenges” (Bar & Bench, Jan. 4, 2024).
- SLAPP Suits in the Indian Context (The In-House Lawyer, undated).
- M/s Crop Care Federation of India v. Rajasthan Patrika (Delhi HC, Nov. 27, 2009).
- Menon, Guha & Dhonde, Shruti, “SLAPP Suits in the Indian Context” (Bar & Bench, 2024).
- Cannot use defamation as tool to threaten media, says HC (Times of India, May 8, 2020).
- International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), “Undue influence of economic actors on judicial systems” (submission to UN Special Rapporteur, June 2024).
- Bonnard v. Perryman, [1976] 2 All ER 436 (Eng. C.A.) (as cited in the above cases).